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Uncertain Arrivals: Immigration,
Terror, and Democracy After September 11
Peter Margulies*

American immigration law has struggled to balance two crucial values:
democracy and security.1 Historically, national imagery celebrates immigration's
role in renewing democracy. 2 Yet, apprehension about the risks of immigration
has also fueled recurring concerns about the security of American institutions.3
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have heightened this ambivalence.
For some, the post-September 11. relationship between democracy and
security in immigration law is a zero-sum game. Officials stressing security may
view democratic freedoms such as the right to dissent as a vehicle for assistance
to the enemy.4 Conversely, advocates for civil liberties may view changes in
immigration law that enhance security as a threat to fundamental democratic
principles.5 Closer examination reveals, however, that democracy and security are

Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; e-mail:
pmargulies@law.rwu.edu. From 1992 through 2000, 1 directed the Immigration Clinic at St.
Thomas University School of Law in Miami, Florida. I thank Kevin Johnson, Linda Kelly, Steve
Legomsky, David Martin, Hiroshi Motomura, Gerry Neuman, Ellen Saideman, and participants at
the Immigration Law Teachers' Workshop in New Orleans, Louisiana and the LatCrit Conference
in Portland, Oregon for comments on prior drafts.
'See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation ofImmigrationLaw, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,72-90
(1984) (discussing dialectic between desire to control immigration andjudicial regard for individual
rights); cf MARVIN E. FRANKEL & ELLEN SAIDEMAN, OUT OF THE SHADOWS OF NIGHT: THE
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 64-65 (1989) (noting historic tension between
refugees' rights and U.S. State Department's view of American foreign policy interests); Peter
Margulies, DemocraticTransitionsand the FutureofAsylum Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 3,4 (1999)
(same); David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia,
138 U.2 PA. L. REV. 1247, 1331-34 (1990) (discussing political influences on asylum decisions).
See BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 101 (2001) (discussing immigrant
heroes of American "narrative of democratic activism").
3
See id. at 95-96 (discussing images of "bad immigrant... [who] takes things from us and
has nothing to offer in return"); Daniel Kanstroom, Dangerous Undertones of the New Nativism:
Peter Brimelow and the Decline of the West, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE
ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE INTHE UNITED STATES 300,300-13 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (analyzing
concerns of immigration opponents such as Peter Brimelow, author of Alien Nation).
4
See Neil A. Lewis, Ashcrofi Defends Antiterrorism Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at AI
(quoting U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft as asserting, in testimony before Senate Judiciary
Committee: "To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message
is this: your tactics only aid terrorists.").
'See, e.g., NANCY CHANG, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT

63 (2002) (arguing that post-September 11 legislation "permits guilt to be imposed solely on the
basis of political associations protected by the First Amendment"); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54
STAN. L. REV. 953, 1003 (2002) (arguing that post-September 11 response sacrifices freedoms of
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complementary concepts.6 This Article advances an integrative conception of
immigration law based on the interdependence of these core values.
Immigration law has been at the intersection of democracy and security since
the September 11 attacks. Reacting to revelations that many of the attackers
manipulated United States immigration law to enter this country,7 Congress
enacted sweeping legislation, the USA PATRIOT Act (USAPA),8 that provides
for the removal from the United States of immigrants whom the government
proves solicit funds, recruit personnel, or supply other tangible assistance that
directly furthers terrorist activity.9 To be applied retroactively as well as
prospectively, the USAPA imposes on the immigrant the burden of proving that
he did not know and should not reasonably have known that his actions would
support terrorist acts.'° The USAPA also provides for the removal of immigrants
who render assistance to groups designated by the U.S. Secretary of State as
engaging in terrorist activity."
In addition to expanding grounds for removal of immigrants, the postSeptember 11 immigration arena has triggered debates about the use of ethnicity
and nationality in antiterrorist immigration enforcement, and about public and
media access to immigration proceedings. The U.S. Department of Justice has
detained hundreds of alleged visa violators from countries where Al Qaeda is
active." The government has also closed immigration proceedings, asserting the

noncitizens and "constitutes a reprise of some ofthe worst mistakes of our past"); Ronald Dworkin,
The Threat to Patriotism,N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44,44 (asserting that post-September
11 legislation designed to disrupt terrorist groups' ability to raise funds and recruit new members
"sets out a new, breathtakingly vague and broad definition of terrorism" and is inconsistent with our
established
laws and values).
6
See 147 CONG. REC. Si 1019 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (quoting
Benjamin Franklin as observing that "a nation that would trade its liberties for security deserves
neither").
7
See Patrick J. McDonnell & Russell Carollo, An Easy Entryfor Attackers: Immigration
Flaws Garner Attention as Authorities Track the Sept. 11 Hiackers' Movements Through the
United States, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at Al.
8
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, 115 Stat.
345 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2001)).
9
1d. § 41 l(a)(l)(F), 115 Stat. at 346-47 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)).
"Ild. § 41 l(a)(l)(D), 115 Stat. at 346 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii)).
"Id. § 41 l(a)(2), 115 Stat. at 348 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(F)).
2
See Susan M. Akran & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, andImmigration Law After
September 11, 2001. The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295,
295-301(2002) (describing marginalization of particular communities after September 11); Sameer
Ashar, Immigration Enforcement andSubordination: The Consequences of RacialProfilingAfter
September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1197-99 (2002) (same); Letti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist,49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1575-86 (2002) (same). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The
Case Against Race Profiling in ImmigrationEnforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 688-728 (2000)
(arguing against use of race or ethnicity as tool in immigration enforcement, on grounds that such
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need to avoid inadvertent disclosures to terrorist groups. 3 These developments
raise substantial concerns about the relationship between immigration law,
security, and democracy.
An integrative approach can help resolve the relationship between security
and democracy in immigration law. Under an integrative approach, enhancing
security also provides an opportunity to strengthen democracy. The political
branches should retain the power to make immigration policy flexible enough to
disrupt the infrastructure of terrorism.14 On the other hand, the plenary deference
courts have historically accorded Congress in the immigration arena fails to
accord proper respect to the humanity of immigrants and emboldens government
to cut corners on democracy for all. To respond to these concerns, an integrative
approach must combine flexibility with fit, tailoring measures to meet legitimate
security goals through means least restrictive of liberty.
To integrate democracy and security values, this Article suggests reliance on
two criteria: institutional accountability and fairness in time. Institutional
accountability promotes transparency of transnational organizations supporting
terror and curbs overreaching by the United States government in combating
terrorism. Fairness in time protects expectations of immigrants through principles
such as notice and prospectivity. Immigration decisionmakers should reject any
measure that fails the test of either institutional accountability or fairness in time.
The Article is in five parts. Part I offers a brief history of the interaction of
democracy and security in American immigration law. Part II sets out an
integrative approach to analysis of immigration law responses to the attacks,
articulating the tests of institutional accountability and fairness in time. Part III
extends the integrative approach to analysis of detention based on nationality,
ethnicity, or religion. Part IV examines justifications for the nondisclosure of
evidence in immigration proceedings. Part V applies the integrative approach to
the limits on association in the USAPA. For each issue, the flexibility and fit
provided by the tests of institutional accountability and fairness in time preserve
the fruitful interaction of democracy and security.

criteria lead to harassment of citizens and lawful permanent residents).
3
See William Glaberson, U.S. Asks To Use Secret Evidence in Many Cases of Deportation,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at B1.
4
A complete convergence of immigration law with otherwise applicable constitutional law
would preclude this flexibility. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference
ThatAlienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047, 1130-33 (1994) (arguing that deportation grounds
should track First Amendment protections while acknowledging that courts have historically
interpreted First Amendment more flexibly in deportation setting).

484
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I. SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN
IMMIGRATION HISTORY: THE REDS, WHITES, AND BLUES
Debates about the relationship of security and democracy start with the
framers. Alexander Hamilton, discussing the relationship of security and liberty
in wartime, observed that Americans would "resort for repose and security, to
institutions, which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights."' 5
There has always been a counterweight to Hamilton's dire prediction: the
judgment embodied in American constitutionalism that dispensing with liberty
threatens our security.' 6 Yet, a theory of governance that neglects security
altogether will eventually have little liberty to protect.
Before we explore the relationship of democracy, security, and terrorism in
greater depth, it may be helpful to define our terms. Democracy contemplates a
community of discourse whose members undertake the challenge of selfgovernment. 7 Self-government requires a commitment to promoting the
participation of all members of the community and avoiding barriers to
participation erected by official arbitrariness, private overreaching, and patterns
of inequality. 8 The value of security, defined as physical safety and freedom
from fear, flows from this same premise. Just as a tyrant who governs through
force and fear destroys self-government, entities inside or outside a country that
employ such means to exert their will on a country's affairs impose a similar
toll. '" Fear cuts the legs out from under participation, rendering people afraid of

5
6

THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

1 See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME

168 (2001) ("If democratic self-government
involves a nation's generation-spanning struggle to live under self-given foundational law over time,
apart from or even contrary to popular will at any given moment, the counter-majoritarian difficulty
collapses."); cf JON ELSTER, SocialInstitutions,in NUTS AND BOLTS FORTHE SOCIAL SCIENCES 147,

150 (1989) (observing that "[t]he parts of a constitution that make it more difficult to change the
constitution than to enact ordinary legislation ... force people to think twice before they change
it").

17The account offered here echoes the civic humanist understanding articulated by political
theorists such as Hannah Arendt and Michael Walzer. E.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION (1958); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND

EQUALITY (1983); cf Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the
Unexpected: A Civic Republican View ofDifference and ClinicalLegal Education, 88 Nw. U. L.

REV. 695,696-701 (1994) (discussing application ofcivic humanist theory to narratives ofpoverty
law).
ISee WALZER, supra note 17, at 19.
9
See id. at 64-67 (discussing importance of security as foundation for just society).
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leaving their homes to assemble and engage in conversation about public matters
necessary for self-government."z
Terrorism may involve the most contested definition in our trio of terms. In
the political thought of the twentieth century, "terror" often was linked with
violence by the state."1 However, American political discourse has for some time
embodied images of terrorism as intentional violence against civilians committed
by groups that do not publicly associate themselves with states but may benefit
from state sponsorship or, as in the case of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, exercise
clandestine control over the state apparatus.22
Terrorism as the intentional targeting of civilians by nongovernmental
groups engenders special challenges for both democracy and security. The
clandestine nature of terrorist activity has historically hindered efforts to hold
terrorists responsible through economic and military sanctions that the international community relies upon to control states. In addition, terrorist actions, such
as assassinations, decimate democratic institutions and can pave the way for
replacement of a weakened democracy by a totalitarian regime.2 3 Moreover,
terrorist mass murders, including both Oklahoma City and September 11, take
place in cities, targeting the diversity at the heart of American democratic life.24

20

See Irving L. Markovitz, Constitutions, the Federalist Papers, and the Transition to
Democracy, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY 42, 58 (Lisa Anderson ed., 1999) (citing THE
FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 234 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("Stability in Government,
is essential.., to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which are among the chief
blessings of civil society.")); cf Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is...
and Is Not, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY 3, 7-8 (Geoffrey Pridham ed., 1995) (discussing
adverse
impact of recurring violence on democratic institutions).
2
'See, e.g., DANA R. VILLA, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, TERROR: ESSAYS ON THE THOUGHT OF
HANNAHARENDT 14-21 (1999) (discussing "totalitarian terror"); cf Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism,
Selective Deportationand the FirstAmendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313,
323 (2000) (discussing "state terrorism" as one strand in debates about definition of terrorism).
22
See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A

DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 6 (1998) (defining terrorism as "violence conducted as part of a political

strategy by a subnational group or secret agents of a foreign state"); cf Richard Falk, Ends and
Means: Defining a Just War, THE NATION, Oct. 29, 2001, at 11, 12 (arguing that Al Qaeda is
"transnational actor... [whose] relationship to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan [was] contingent,
with Al Qaeda being more the sponsor of the state rather than the other way around").
23
Cf HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 344 (1951) (noting power of
"terror" and stating that Nazis' assassination with impunity of socialists during dwindling days of
Weimar Republic "made clear to the population at large that the power of the Nazis was greater than
that of the authorities and that it was safer to be a member of a Nazi paramilitary organization than
a loyal24Republican").
See Kanan Makiya & Hassan Mneimneh, Manualfor a 'Raid,'N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 17,
2002, at 18, 20 (discussing Al Qaeda training manuals' targeting of population centers).
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For these reasons, this Article defines terrorism as the intentional targeting of
civilians for political purposes by nongovernmental groups.25
Terrorism also creates risks for both democracy and security. Gripped by
fear, members of a democratic community may address terrorist threats by
discounting the individual rights that safeguard participation for all.26 Unless the
constitutional framework provides a remedy, James Madison predicted,
[T]here is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker
party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such Democracies
have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been
found incompatible with personal security.., and have in general been
as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths.27
Moreover, effective security measures demand the shared stake that can "only
emerge in a settled state with just and equitable institutions."" A state must be
settled and stable to inspire patriotic allegiance 29 but must also be just.
American immigration law has stressed security's role as a bulwark of
democracy. Over a century ago, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese
Exclusion Case),30 the United States Supreme Court established the cornerstone
of American immigration law-Congress's "plenary power" over substantive
criteria for the admission and removal of immigrants3 '-by invoking the nation's
25

0f course, abuses by states-including allies of America-must also elicit concern. See
Margulies, supra note 1,at I1 (arguing that deference to U.S. Department of State is inappropriate
in asylum adjudication because "the State Department ...has an interest in downplaying human
rights 26
problems to avoid rocking the foreign policy boat").

Cf JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING

CIVIL LIBERTIES INTHE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY

33-46 (1999) (detailing pre-September 11

law enforcement targeting of Palestinian students for espousing unpopular views).
27
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E.Cooke ed., 1961).
28
Michael Mallett, The Theory and Practice of Warfare in Machiavelli's Republic, in
MACHIAVELLI AND REPUBLICANISM
29

173, 179 (Gisela Bock et al. eds., 1990).

1d

30130 U.S. 581 (1889).

"Id. at 589-611. Although I use the term "immigrant" throughout the Article, the term as used
here actually takes in a varied group. A brief typology of aliens (the term used most often by courts)
may be useful here:
1. Lawful permanent resident aliens (LPRs) include close relatives of U.S. citizens who are
beneficiaries of visa petitions filed by citizen spouses and parents, see Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000), as well as persons granted permanent
residence as employees with special skills not possessed by other LPRs or citizens. See INA §
203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i). LPRs can be removed (i.e., deported) on various behaviorrelated grounds, including criminal convictions. See INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (Supp.
2002).
2. Lawful nonimmigrants are granted temporary visas for short periods in the case of tourists
or other visitors, or for longer periods in the case of students or nonimmigrant workers, trainees, or
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duty to "preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression
and encroachment."32 The Court's rationale seems prescient in the wake of the
September 11 hijackers' use of the immigration system to facilitate the most
lethal attack in American history.
However, appreciation of the Court's foresight should not mask awareness
of the heavy cost that application of the plenary power imposes on democratic
principles. The losing party in Chae Chan Ping,for example, did not pose a threat
to public safety but had worked hard to obtain a lawful immigration status in this
country and then reasonably relied on that status in making basic life decisions.
Congress, motivated principally by racial animus, summarily undermined that
reliance by enacting the Chinese Exclusion Act.33 In upholding Chae's exclusion,
the Court discounted both his reliance and the animus that prompted the
legislation, holding that in the immigration sphere Congress could act in a manner
that would "be unacceptable if applied to citizens."34

intracompany transferees. See INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2000). The September 11
hijackers came in as visitors or students and in some cases "overstayed," i.e., stayed past the date
by which they had agreed to leave as a condition of obtaining their visas. See McDonnell & Carollo,
supra note 7.
3. Undocumented aliens consist of two subgroups. The first subgroup, entrants, includes
aliens who have entered without inspection, crossing over a border or through a port of entry such
as an airport without being detected by immigration authorities. See INA § 275(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1325(a). The second subgroup consists of nonentrants, who have been apprehended seeking
entrance at a port of entry or border crossing within the United States or who seek admission to the
United States at a consulate abroad. See INA § 275(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
As a general matter, courts have held that among aliens, nonentrants have the weakest
constitutional protections while LPRs have the strongest. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 689-96 (2001) (asserting that indefinite detention of LPRs who have received final removal
order but whose countries of origin have declined to accept them raises serious due process concerns
while distinguishing cases upholding indefinite detention of nonentrants); cf David A. Martin,
GraduatedApplicationof ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Aliens: The Real MeaningofZadvydas v.
Davis, 2001 SuP. CT. REv. 47, 92-101 (arguing that constitutional protections should in many cases
hinge on where alien fits in typology outlined above). The integrative approach, see infra note 51
and accompanying text, generally places less emphasis on the immigrant's status. I indicate in the
text where immigrant status does make a difference.
32
See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 589.
33
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 15-17 (1992) (discussing roots of
Chinese Exclusion Act in enmity and envy of white Californians toward Chinese immigrants);
Richard P. Cole & Gabriel J. Chin, Emerging from the Margin of Historical Consciousness:
Chinese Immigrants and the History ofAmerican Law, 17 LAW & HIST. REv. 325, 326-29 (1999)
(same). The facts of the ChineseExclusion Case are compelling. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at
582. Chae had traveled to China, relying on federal legislation that allowed Chinese laborers to
return to the United States after temporarily leaving the country. Id. After Chae had started his trip,
Congress changed the law so that Chae and others similarly situated became excludable aliens. Id.
Immigration authorities barred Chae from reentry. Id.
34
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
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The plenary power doctrine, read broadly, creates a separate sphere in which
democracy has little purchase. However, both immigrants and immigration law
have striven for a more complex portrait of the interaction of democracy and
security.35 Immigrant activists like the labor leader Harry Bridges, who
successfully fought deportation,3 6 and the anarchist Emma Goldman, who failed
in her fight, called America to account for inequality toward the poor and
disenfranchised. Efforts to redress these inequities enhance both American
democracy and America's standing in the world.37
Times of crisis erode this appreciation for the interdependence of democracy
and security. In such times, the courts have often, but not always, invoked the
plenary power as ajustification for deference to the political branches. Courts did
nothing to curb the "Palmer Raids" initiated by then-U.S. Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer and his young deputy, J. Edgar Hoover, during the "Red Scare"
after World War I that resulted in the jailing and deportation of many immigrants
suspected of radical activities.38 During the anti-Communist hysteria of the
McCarthy era, the Supreme Court upheld the indefinite detention, based on secret
evidence of national security risks, of persons seeking admission to the United
States. 39 However, the McCarthy era also spurred courts to respond with greater
vigor to the tension between First Amendment principles and the deportation of
immigrants for allegedly subversive speech or association. In a series of cases
dating from the McCarthy era, the Supreme Court held that deportation required
not merely nominal membership in an organization such as the Communist Party
but "meaningful association" or a "degree of participation" in the activities of the
organization.4"
In the last twenty years, the law of asylum, established by statute and
international agreement, has added another strand in the interweaving of

35
1n addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in areas distinct from
immigration regulation, such as criminal law, discrimination against aliens is suspect. See, e.g.,
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that aliens charged with crime
have right to due process of law); cf Michael Scaperlanda, PartialMembership: Aliens and the
Constitutional
Community, 81 IOwA L. REV. 707, 741-43 (1996) (discussing Wong Wing).
36

See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 156-57 (1945); HONIG, supra note 2, at 81.
See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregationas a Cold WarImperative, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE 106, 109-10 (Richard Delgado ed., 2000) (discussing international
37

controversies
spurred by racial discrimination within United States).
38

See GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 150 (1996).
See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215-16 (1953); United

39

States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1950); cf Charles D. Weisselberg, The
Exclusion andDetention ofAliens: Lessonsfrom the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143

U. PA. L. REV. 933, 954-85 (1995) (discussing history of these cases).
4

'E.g., Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355
U.S. 115, 120-21 (1957).
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democracy and security. 4 Granting asylum to persons with a well-founded fear

of persecution in their country of origin promotes international mobilization
against regimes that violate human rights. Makers of U.S. foreign policy
sometimes view asylum claims as an embarrassment, particularly when those
claims concern governments that the United States supports.4 2 A more productive

perspective would treat asylum determinations as a kind of "forward indicator"
of security problems triggered by the excesses of despotic regimes. Viewed in
this light, asylum claims not only preserve democracy but also help gauge when
U.S. foreign policies should change to avoid future crises.
The courts have also imposed some democratic checks on the discretion of

immigration policymakers. For example, the Supreme Court in two recent
decisions affirmed the availability of habeas corpus in the immigration sphere43

and proceeded to invalidate policies that had yielded inequitable or oppressive
results. In INS v. St. Cyr," the Supreme Court declined to interpret provisions of
the INA as retroactively repealing relief from deportation on which an immigrant

relied in reaching a plea bargain in a criminal case.45 The Court bridled at an
interpretation that would countenance this discounting of reliance interests.46 In
Zadvydas v. Davis,47 the Court held that the government could not detain an LPR

indefinitely without regularly showing that the immigrant was a threat to public

4

'DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 1-11 (Paul T. Lufkin ed.,
1999); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of "Persecution"in United States Asylum
Law, 3 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 5passim (1991) (analyzing meaning of persecution in refugee law); cf

Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence
Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665, 668-69 (1998) (discussing expansion of relief
available for battered immigrant women, who were formerly virtual hostages of abusive U.S. citizen
and resident spouses); Peter Margulies, Asylum, Intersectionality,andAIDS: Women with HIV as
a Persecuted Social Group, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 521 passim (1994) (discussing expansion of
asylum availability for those persecuted on basis ofgender); Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag,
The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 7-8, 17-23 (2001)
procedural barriers to asylum claims).
(discussing
42
See Margulies, supra note 1, at 11; see also Peter Margulies, Children,Parents,andAsylum,
IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 305 n.91 (2001) (discussing effects of foreign policy on asylum policy).
15 GEO.
43
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298-314
(2001). For discussions of habeas corpus and judicial review in the immigration context, see
STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY 143-222 (1987); David Cole, Jurisdiction
and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress's Control of Federal
Jurisdiction,86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2494-512 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive
Detention, and the Removal ofAliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 987-1020 (1998).
44533 U.S. 289 (2001).
45
1d. at 293, 325-26.
46Cf Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
ConstitutionalNorms andStatutorylnterpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545,560-64 (1990) (arguing that
courts have used statutory interpretation to infuse immigration doctrine with constitutional
principles).
47533 U.S. 678 (2001).

490

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2002: 481

safety or national security. 48 The Court viewed the governmental overreaching
and undermining of reasonable expectations in these cases as threatening
democracy while offering illusory security benefits.
II. AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION LAW

This brief history of American immigration law demonstrates that the
relationship of democracy and security is not a zero-sum game. Recent Supreme
Court decisions such as Zadvydas v. Davis49 and INS v. St. Cyr" suggest that

democracy and security are mutually constitutive, with each value establishing
the conditions necessary for the other to flourish. Decisionmakers trade off one
value against the other only at the risk of losing both.
The complementary relationship between democracy and security in
immigration law requires what political theorists call an integrative approach."
Political theorists draw a distinction between aggregative and integrative
institutions. In aggregative institutions, efficiency is the guiding norm. Rights
facilitate exchange between constituents of the institution and other institutions. s2
In contrast, integrative institutions focus not on exchange, but on identity. They
emphasize empathy, reciprocity, and a shared search for core values. 3 The goal
of an integrative institution is not homogeneity, but instead an equitable regard
for the importance of diverse perspectives. 4 An integrative institution should
respond to diversity, not just at a particular moment, but over time. 5 Flexibility
and the capacity to experiment are therefore crucial elements of an integrative
approach.
Viewed in this light, the integrative approach is superior to the two most
prominent alternatives: the deference and equivalency theses. For the deference

48

1d. at 689.

49533 U.S. 678 (2001).

50533 U.S. 289 (2001).
5

See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZA-

TIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 124-29 (1989). My discussion here borrows from an earlier article on
integrative approaches to law reform litigation. See Peter Margulies, The New Class Action
Jurisprudence
and Public Interest Law, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 487, 526-38 (1999).
52
See MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 51, at 125 ("Within an aggregative process, rights are
either rules designed to ameliorate imperfections in the system of exchange, or they are resources
distributed
as initial endowments and available for barter.").
53
1d. (noting that, in an integrative process, "rights express key aspects of the structure of
social belief. They are metaphors of human unity, symbolizing the common destiny and humanity
of those who share them.").
54
1d. at 126-27; cf id at 127 (rejecting use of integrative institutions to cloak social conflict
or co-opt groups subjected to ongoing subordination).
55See WALZER, supra note 17, at 58 (discussing importance to democracy of adjusting to
changing circumstances).
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thesis, which takes plenary power over immigration as its touchstone, national
security requires that courts accord the political branches carte blanche in
immigration matters. 6 The deference thesis fails, however, to take into account
how this judicial abdication loosens the checks and balances crucial to both
democracy and security. In contrast, the equivalency thesis regards as suspect any
differences between immigration jurisprudence and other areas of American law,
such as the constitutional and criminal domains.57 The equivalency thesis fails to
acknowledge the threat to democracy posed by insecure institutions of governance,58 the importance of immigration law in promoting the security that enables
democracy, and the resounding manner in which immigrants coming to America
"vote with their feet" for the union of democracy and security, often emigrating
from countries suffering from the absence of both attributes.
Under an integrative approach to immigration law, democracy and security
survive and prevail together. When events, either internal or external, create the
impetus for change, decisionmakers should take the opportunity to refine
commitments to both values. Seizing this opportunity is not easy. Crises such as
September 11 tend to cast people back on their instincts, arguing reflexively for
more government action to police immigrants, or arguing that government cannot
be trusted to act without invidious consequences. Such reactions do not meet the
challenge of the moment. The more difficult mission requires asking what
governmental initiatives can both promote security and affirm democracy. To
consider this question, an integrative approach provides two elements: institutional accountability and fairness in time.
A. InstitutionalAccountability
One factor common to discussions of democracy and security is the
accountability of institutions. Democracy contemplates self-governance,
reflecting careful deliberation and the articulation of reasons for decisions.59 Even
if it seems convenient at times to license the government to act arbitrarily with
respect to particular groups such as immigrants, the best practice in a democracy
is to hold the government to account. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Zadvydas, requiring procedural safeguards for indefinite INS detention of LPRs,
embodies this view.6 °

56

See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1889).
See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 26, at 33-46; cf Bosniak, supra note 14, at 1130-33
(arguing that deportation grounds regulating behavior should track First Amendment law in other
settings).
57

58

See Schmitter & Karl, supra note 20, at 7-8.

59

See RUBENFELD,

6533

U.S. at 682.

supra note 16, at 163-77;

WALZER,

supra note 17, at 64-85.
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Institutional accountability also helps combat those transnational organizations, such as Al Qaeda, that use fear to infringe on the crucial democratic
prerogative of self-government. 6 When persons, groups, or states threaten the
lives of persons in the United States, the nation should hold accountable those
making such threats.62 By insisting on accountability, the government reduces the
risk that American immigrants and citizens will endure further deadly attacks.63
Immigration legislation should play a significant role in this transnational
accountability project.
Immigration law can promote transnational accountability by transforming
the institutional practices of entities that support violence against innocent
civilians here and abroad. Entities that support terrorist activity such as the
targeting of civilians by sharing funds, information, and training should not be
able to exploit their operatives' otherwise lawful immigration status in the United
States. Similarly, immigration law should provide no safe harbor for persons,
groups, or states that tacitly or negligently support violence against civilians by
failing to put in place internal systems of accountability.64
The juxtaposition of democratic and security-based conceptions of
institutional accountability demonstrates their interdependence. Immigration
laws, regulations, and enforcement that target the infrastructure of terror cannot
invoke generalizations in place of sound factfinding and analysis.65 Failing this
61

See HEYMANN, supra note 22, at 9-18 (discussing effects of terrorism on governance).
Cf id at 47-77 (discussing methods for holding terrorist organizations accountable); id. at
71 ("[S]tate sponsors of terrorism often do their best to conceal their involvement for the very
purpose
of avoiding international condemnation and potential retaliation by the targeted state.").
63
The September 11 hijackers' victims included foreign visitors, undocumented persons,
LPRs, and former refugees. See, e.g., Tara Bahrampour et al., Blunt Talker, DevotedAunt, Russian
Emigre, Young but Wise Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, at A15 (telling story of Faina Rapoport,
who fled religious persecution in Russia, received refugee status in United States, and worked as
computer programmer in World Trade Center). The strong presence of immigrants in America's
cities makes it likely that future attacks would exact a similar toll. See Makiya & Mneimneh, supra
note 24, at 18, 20 (noting "practical considerations that surely would have been part ofthe planning
stage [of the hijackings] (such as maximizing the number of casualties by targeting heavily
populated buildings)"). The secondary economic impact on immigrants has also been severe,
including massive layoffs in the restaurant and hospitality industries that employ hundreds of
thousands of immigrants. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Wall Street to Washington, Layoffs Shatter
Lives; D.C. Tourism Losses Hit Immigrants Hard, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2001, at Al. Both
immigrants and citizens have a stake in measures consistent with democracy that reduce the risk of
future attacks.
64
See William F. Wechsler, Stranglingthe Hydra: TargetingAI Qaeda'sFinances,in How
DID THIS HAPPEN? 129, 133-35 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001) (discussing
diversion of funds, frequently without official authorization, from Islamic charities to terrorist
activities).
65
See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT: MYTH OR REALITY 121-25 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing ebb and flow of liberalization in Iran); cf Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political
Islam, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 48, 50-52 (discussing diversity and change in Islamic
62
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test would jeopardize both democratic and security-based accountability.
Similarly, efforts to eliminate terrorist targeting of civilians are not sustainable
unless policymakers also seek to reduce overreaching by states friendly to
American interests.66
This transnational conception of accountability fits squarely within the broad
authority given to Congress to regulate immigration. It also is consistent with the
scrutiny of persecution abroad provided by American asylum law. Indeed, as the
case of the Taliban and their Al Qaeda principals reveals, the policies of
governments that violate human rights in their own countries can also threaten the
lives ofpersons in the United States. Here, as elsewhere, accountability promotes
both democracy and security.
B. Fairness in Time
To complement institutional accountability, an integrative account adds
fairness in time. A conception of time is crucial to democracy. Constitutional
democracies do not exist solely in the present. Instead, they cohere through
commitments shaped over time.67 Time explains why courts serve democracy by
ensuring that transitory majorities cannot sweep away constitutional principles.68
Many of these principles, embodied in the Ex Post Facto, Contracts, and Due
Process Clauses of the United States Constitution, also contemplate a particular
relationship between past, present, and future that helps define the role of
government.
In a democracy, prospectivity is the default position.69 Governments honor
reasonable expectations on which persons rely; when a democracy wants people
to adjust their expectations or conform their conduct, it provides some manner of
notice of the change.7 ° An integrative approach refers to the temporal obligations
that democratic governments assume as "fairness in time."'"

world).
66
See Edward W. Said, A New Currentin Palestine,THE NATION, Feb. 4, 2002, at 14, 14-15
(analyzing failures of Ariel Sharon's government in Israel, as well as those of Yasir Arafat's
Palestinian Authority).
67
See ARENDT, supra note 17, at 243-47 (discussing importance of promises for shaping
future 68of self-governance).
See RUBENFELD, supra note 16, at 168; cf WALZER, supra note 17, at 58 (arguing that
consent to domination by others, "given at a single moment in time," is not sufficient to waive
requirements
ofjustice and democracy).
69
RUTi G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 215 (2000) (discussing principle of prospectivity
in transitions to democracy).
7
°See id.
71
A number of immigration scholars have articulated analogous concerns, focusing on the
retroactivity provisions of the 1996 amendments to immigration laws that expanded the category
of criminal offenses considered "aggravated felonies," conviction of which would subject an
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Fairness in time is important not just for its own sake, but also because it
instills in the public the dispositions necessary for self-governance.72 Changing
rules without notice resembles a favorite totalitarian practice: rewriting the past.73
When rules change without notice, people spend their time peering over their
shoulders, wondering what innocent or inadvertent portions of their past will
come back to haunt them. Ultimately, the government's failure to practice
fairness in time can breed alienation, despair,74 and violence. 5 Unconstrained
retroactivity thus deprives persons of the opportunity to develop habits that are
conducive to democratic life.76
Despite this democratic wisdom, American immigration law has often
trenched on the expectations of immigrants, subjecting them to the changing
winds of policy and politics without the protection that citizens receive. Congress
may state grounds for deportation or removal that are retroactive, giving
immigrants no opportunity to conform their conduct. Unlike the criminal law,
immigration provisions generally are not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause or
other constitutional guarantees of fairness in time.77
The impact of such confounded expectations on the democratic dispositions
of immigrants may seem irrelevant, given that American law already excludes
immigrants from participation in core democratic rituals such as voting.7 8

immigrant to removal. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-627, 3009-627 to -628 (1996) (amending 8 U.S.C. §
1 101 (a)(43)); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportationand Justice:A ConstitutionalDialogue,41 B.C. L.
REV. 771, 771-78 (2000); Martin, supra note 31, at 116-17, 126-36; Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking
Retroactive DeportationLaws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99 (1998);
Nancy Morawetz, Understandingthe Impact of the 1996 DeportationLaws andthe LimitedScope
of ProposedReforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1937 (2000).
7Justice Brandeis made this point eloquently in Whitney v. California,274 U.S. 357 (1927):
"Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free
to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the
arbitrary." Id. at 375; cf EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 46 (2002) (analyzing Brandeis's account).
13See HANNAH ARENDT, Truth in Politics, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 227, 231, 256
(1954) (discussing alteration of past in Soviet Union, including erasure of Trotsky and other foes
of Stalin from history books).
74
Cf WALZER, supra note 17, at 59 (arguing that immigrants such as metics, guest workers
ofancient Athens, without political rights or prospect ofcitizenship for themselves or their children,
"experience the state as a pervasive and frightening power that shapes their lives and regulates their
every move ...[and view] deportation [as] a continuous practical threat").
75See HEYMANN, supra note 22, at 114 (observing that harsh governmental responses to
terrorism "have at times poured kerosene on the fire of terrorist violence, increasing opposition to
the government and expanding the scope of the conflict").
6
7 See ARENDT, supra note 73, at 257 (noting that when governments rewrite history, "the
sense by which we take our bearings in the real world ... is being destroyed").
7See Kanstroom, supra note 7 1, at 773, 780-85.
78
Cf HONIG, supra note 2, at 102 (arguing for expansion of alien suffrage).
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However, this argument ignores both time and accountability. First, consider
time. Since the United States promotes the naturalization of immigrants,
immigrant and citizen exist on a temporal continuum. Immigration policy should
prepare immigrants for full-fledged participation in democratic life, not alienate
them before they even have a chance to participate. Second, accountability suffers
because the political branches' power to upset immigrants' expectations makes
immigrants a convenient scapegoat for problems elsewhere in our democracy.79
Curbing this power would oblige policymakers to address fundamental issues
instead of blaming immigrants to placate a disgruntled electorate.
Perhaps recognizing these concerns, courts have never been entirely
comfortable with the idea of a separate immigration sphere where fairness in time
need not apply. Illustrating this unease, the Supreme Court in St. Cyr recently
strove to interpret the INA to avoid the compromise of reliance interests that
retroactive application would have engendered.8 ° With its decision, the Court may
have signaled that fairness in time has finally come of age in immigration law.
That development is overdue.
III. DETENTION BASED ON NATIONALITY

An appropriate initial testing ground for the integrative approach is the
government's selective detention of overstays from countries where Al Qaeda is
active. In the weeks after September 11, the government detained over a thousand
persons. Some had committed no violation of American law. Most detainees
came from countries where Al Qaeda is active, and were deportable because they
have overstayed their nonimmigrant visas.81
Use of nationality, ethnicity, or religion as a criterion in antiterrorist policy
illustrates the contingent nature of the relationship between democracy and
security. On the one hand, reliance on factors such as nationality or religion
erodes the institutional accountability of law enforcement. Reliance on these
broad characteristics encourages law enforcement authorities to use crude

79

This is one reason that at times of political unrest, such as the McCarthy era, the
government's focus has been on immigrants as wrongdoers. Id. at 34 (discussing "the politics of
foreignness-the cultural symbolic organization of a social crisis into a resolution-producing
confrontation between an 'us' and a 'them').
80533 U.S. at 309-10.
81
The government held most of the detainees for several months, and then either released or
deported them. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98 n.4
(D.D.C. 2002); Susan Sachs, Dispute That PreventedNew Jersey DeportationsIs Resolved, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2002, at A11. A civil rights group has also filed a class action lawsuit alleging that
the post-September 11 detentions violate constitutional and statutory guarantees. See Turkmen v.
Ashcroft, No. 02-Civ-02307-JG (E.D.N.Y. complaint filed Apr. 17, 2002), availableat
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/civil.html.
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measures in place of careful policing. Moreover, employing such factors
generates invidious images and practices that spill over from the immigration
realm into the broader democratic landscape.82
On the other hand, the heightened stakes for self-government and the
challenge posed by transnational obstacles to collecting information in terrorism
cases argue for some continuing role for reliance on nationality in enforcement.
The ability to prevent future attacks from entities outside the United States is at
the core of our ability to govern ourselves. External threats to our independence
as a self-governing community83 justify greater flexibility than transgressions
perpetrated by those with more mundane internal agendas.84 Moreover, the
transnational sphere of terrorist groups' operations makes it materially more

82

One component of the post-September II effort to apprehend immigration law violators
from countries where Al Qaeda is active is the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)-a
national criminal justice database. See Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to the
Commissioner of INS, the Directors of the FBI and the U.S. Marshals Service, and U.S. Attorneys,
on Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative 1-3 (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Guidance],
available at http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/documents; Dan Eggen, Deportee
Sweep Will Start with Mideast Focus, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al. Local and state law
enforcement personnel use the database reactively, "running" names and other data such as license
plate numbers when they make a stop for another purpose. Nationality-based NCIC data will
encourage local law enforcement officials to stop persons whose perceived attributes match those
of the targeted group. Persons stopped in this manner will include U.S. citizens and LPRs. Cf
HEYMANN, supra note 22, at 114 (discussing tendency of antiterrorist law enforcement to become
discriminatory); Johnson, supra note 12, at 688 (discussing impact on citizens and residents ofusing
profiles in immigration enforcement).
83
See WALZER, supra note 17, at 84-86.
84
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (noting that in cases of"terrorism or other
special circumstances ...

special arguments might be made ...

for heightened deference to the

political branches with respect to matters of national security"); Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d
542, 556-57 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that government, when making decision to apprehend
individual suspected of plotting terrorist activity-in that case pre-September II plan to bomb
World Trade Center-is entitled to consider not only probability that individual has engaged in such
activity, but gravity of destruction if plot succeeds). For further discussion of Kiareldeen, see infra
note 119 (discussing secret evidence).
Indeed, even for routine immigration apprehensions, the Supreme Court has expressly
declined to apply the exclusionary rule. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046-47
(1984) (asserting that "the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings
are both unusual and significant ...
[the petitioner, an undocumented immigrant] is a person whose
unregistered presence in this country, without more, constitutes a crime"). But see Johnson, supra
note 12, at 707-10 (criticizing racial profiling in ordinary immigration enforcement).
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difficult to obtain individualized information.85 Broader criteria may be necessary
to overcome this transnational information deficit.
At this difficult juncture, the integrative approach can make a difference.
Because reliance on race or ethnicity always creates tensions with democratic
ideals of equality,86 courts should reject the deference model, which would
tolerate virtually any governmental action in the immigration sphere. However,
the self-government and information challenges inherent in immigration law also
counsel skepticism about the equivalency view, which seeks to press immigration
law into mechanical conformity with other sectors of American jurisprudence.87
Reconciling these concerns, an integrative approach would permit immigration
authorities to use nationality, ethnicity, or religion as factors influencing
responses to terrorism only if: (1) the governmental response does not trigger
concerns about fairness in time, (2) use of such factors is reasonably related to
national security goals, and (3) no less restrictive strategy is practicable.
Unfortunately, the government's selective detention of overstays does not
pass this integrative test. It is true that overstays cannot invoke fairness in time.
Persons who breach their agreement to leave the United States after a specific
period of time should not expect immigration authorities to ratify that choice.88

85

See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing
how transnational dimension shapes context for determining scope of First Amendment protections
in antiterrorism enforcement efforts); cf Neuman, supra note 21, at 331 ("Foreign organizations
differ from domestic organizations in the degree to which the federal government has the capacity
to control their actions directly. The United States has limited ability to enforce anti-terrorist
legislation against foreign organizations that are based in countries with which the United States has
amicable relations, and even less ability to enforce it against organizations that are based in hostile
countries.").
86
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1280-83 (2000) (discussing racial implications of "stop and frisk" doctrine); Dorothy E.Roberts,
Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-MaintenancePolicing, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 775, 818 (1999) (discussing problems with racial profiling in law enforcement); cf
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Disorderin the Inner City, 32 LAW &
SoC'Y REV. 805, 819 (1998) (discussing social disorganization caused by drug trade while arguing
against law enforcement approaches such as mandatory minimum sentences for drug possession that
disproportionately target low-income persons of color).
8
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (discussing equivalency and deference
models).
88
While lay commentators sometimes refer to overstaying as a "minor" violation, see Sachs,
supra note 81, this characterization is overly casual. Overstaying on a nonimmigrant visa is a
circumvention of statutory and administrative control over immigration. By overstaying, a
nonimmigrant visa-holder evades the more thorough review imposed on applicants for permanent
residence. See McDonnell & Carollo, supra note 7 (discussing strategy of September 11 hijackers).
Overstays act on the knowledge that INS historically has lacked the resources to apprehend those
who fail to comply with immigration requirements, in essence betting that future immigration
enforcement will continue to be lax. However, fairness in time does not require that the law back
this wager. Enforcement regimes are inherently subject to change. See Gerard E.Lynch, Our
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However, this is merely the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry under the
integrative approach. The government still has to demonstrate a reasonable
relationship with national security goals and the absence of less restrictive
alternatives. To be consistent with these criteria, detention of overstays should
not exceed the time reasonably required to assess the extent of the immigrant's
terrorist ties, other indicia of dangerousness, and flight risk. 9
Generally, detention will not be appropriate for persons with families,jobs,
or other indications of stability, whose history reveals no pattern of dishonesty
or links to terrorism. These criteria may justify detention in particular cases.
Consider, for example, the case ofRabih Haddad, the head of an organization, the
Global Relief Foundation, that the government is investigating for links to
terrorism. Haddad overstayed for three years on an expired tourist visa.9" Haddad
also told an immigration judge that he had no income.9' However, Haddad
previously asserted in writing that he was paid an annual salary of $29,500.92
Haddad also obtained both a gun and a hunting license, which, along with his
employment, were prohibited for a person on a tourist visa.93 The pattern of

Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2120-21 (1998). The
reasonable person understands that she should conform her conduct not to the vagaries of
enforcement, but to the more deliberate and public guidance provided by statutes, regulations, and
case law. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 167 (2001)

("[A]s a matter of general social practice people do not lightly apply the label 'law."'). These
authorities clearly inform the overstay that his or her failure to comply is unlawful. For these
reasons, the overstay's bet on the perpetuation of a lax enforcement regime warrants far less legal
solicitude than, for example, the St. Cyr appellee's forgoing a constitutional right to trial in reliance
on a statutory basis for relief from deportation. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001)
(declining to imply retroactive repeal of section 212(c) of INA, which allows LPRs convicted of
certain crimes to seek relief from deportation).
89
Cf Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 528 (9th Cir. 2002) (striking down as applied INA
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B), that precluded bond for aliens removable as result of
conviction for "aggravated felonies"), cert. grantedsub nom Demore v. Kim, 122 S. Ct. 2696
(2002); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (same). But see Parra v. Perryman, 172
F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding statute). The Supreme Court has already held that postfinal order detention requires an individualized determination. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696. But
see id.
(reserving consideration of"terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments
might be made for forms of preventive detention").
9
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2002).
9
See David Ashenfelter & Niraj Warikoo, Cleric's Secret File Raises Questions on Terror
Role, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 20, 2002, at IA. Haddad has invoked the Fifth Amendment in
declining to cooperate in the government's investigation of the organization that he heads. Id.
92
1d"
93

1d

No. 3]

UNCERTAIN ARRIVALS

deception demonstrated in Haddad's casejustifies skepticism about his assertions
that he would appear for his removal hearing.94
Unfortunately, the government has detained significant numbers of people
under harsh conditions without making such a showing.95 Permitting such blanket
detentions allows the government to use immigrants as scapegoats for larger
problems. Governance by scapegoating does not serve security or democracy.9 6

94

Even in Haddad's case, however, the presence of family suggests a stake in continued
appearances that counseled against detention. Id. Pursuant to an order from U.S. District Judge
Nancy Edmunds, Haddad had a new hearing in late October on his bond and asylum requests. See
David Ashenfelter, U.S. Must Open Caseor Release Haddad,DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 18, 2002,
at IB; Niraj Warikoo, Activist Sees Risk in Leaving U.S., DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 24, 2002, at
7B.
95
See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 81 (discussing case of Anser Mahmood, Pakistani truck driver
who lived with his family in Bayonne, New Jersey; Mahmood was arrested on October 3 and
allegedly was held in isolation for four months at Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn); see
also Christopher Drew & Judith Miller, Though Not Linked to Terrorism, Many Detainees Cannot
Go Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al (noting many detainees have spent several months in
confinement although government has not discovered any evidence linking them to terrorism); cf
Akram & Johnson, supra note 12, at 331-35 (discussing apparent use of nationality in detention
decisions by U.S. Department of Justice and INS); Volpp, supra note 12, at 1576-86 (analyzing
identification of community and persons outside community in post-September 11 discourse and
policy).
96
While the integrative approach outlined here parts company with the deferential model, it
also rejects the equivalency model. The integrative approach would allow the government to
prioritize its investigation by using nationality to select among the group of persons who have come
to this country on student, tourist, or business visas and then violated the terms of their visa by
overstaying. See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 68 Fed.
Reg. 2363 (Jan. 16, 2003) (requiring registration of visitors from countries including Egypt and
Jordan). But see Barry James, U.S. Plan to Monitor Muslims Meets with WidespreadProtest,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at A9 (quoting Pakistani diplomat as asserting that insensitive administration
of registration program will alienate Muslims). Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the September 11
attacks, violated his visa in this fashion, as did at least one of the other hijackers. See McDonnell
& Carollo, supra note 7. Prompt apprehension of Atta could have derailed plans for the attacks. In
light of Atta's overstay history and the Middle Eastern nationalities of all of the hijackers, the
government could reasonably view the combination of overstaying and nationality as a starting point
in its efforts. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999)
(expressing, in dicta, doubts about viability of most selective enforcement claims in immigration
context). However, whatever the starting point of an investigation, subsequent detention of
overstays should require the more particularized criteria set out in the text. Cf Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Ashcroft, 2003 WL 186647, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2003) (denying
preliminary injunction against registration program based, inter alia, on lack of evidence supporting
plaintiffs' claim that federal officials failed to use particularized criteria in making detention
decisions).
Because of its emphasis on reasonableness and fairness in time, the integrative approach is
skeptical about two related government antiterrorist measures: (1) apprehension of persons from
countries where Al Qaeda is active who have received but have failed to comply with final orders
of deportation, see Guidance, supra note 82, at 4; Eggen, supra note 82, and (2) interviews of
students and others recently arrived on visas from countries where Al Qaeda is active, see Susan
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IV. IMMIGRATION, TERRORISM, AND SECRET PROCEEDINGS

In deciding if an immigrant meets the criteria for detention or removal, a
further dilemma arises: whether the government can hold proceedings in secret.
Limits on public and press access erode government accountability. However,
mandating access in all cases could damage security by hindering the government's use of intelligence sources and methods that offer the best hope of
preventing future terrorist attacks. The absolutism of the authoritarian and
equivalency approaches cannot resolve this tension. The tailoring of flexibility
and fit contemplated by the integrative approach is a more promising alternative.
The issue of secret proceedings arose because of a memorandum executed
after September 11 by Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy directing that
hearings in cases designated by the U.S. Attorney General as "special interest"
matters be closed to the public and the media.97 As a result of this memo, the
Executive Office of Immigration Review, a unit within the U.S. Department of
Justice, denied the public and the press access to deportation and bond hearings
concerning post-September 11 detainees.98 The family and friends of detainees
were also denied access.99 Furthermore, the dockets of individual immigration
judges omitted any mention of "special interest" cases."'
For authoritarians, the Creppy Memo was not a big reach. Under the

authoritarian view, Congress's plenary power over immigration signaled
extraordinary judicial deference to executive decisions about matters such as
access to proceedings. Challenged in court, the government argued that any First
Amendment interest asserted by aliens, the press, or the public must bow to a

Sachs, Long Resistant, Police Now StartEmbracingImmigration Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 2002, at A ll (describing interview program). Final order violators, like overstays, have a weak
fairness in time argument rooted in a gamble on continued lax enforcement for which they should
assume the risk. However,, final order violators have also been through exhaustive immigration
proceedings that typically would have revealed any evidence of terrorist activity and have already
resulted in detention in appropriate cases. Students and other recent lawful arrivals have a colorable
fairness in time argument since their visa application did not require them to consent to impromptu
interviews based on nationality. Given the doubts about the voluntariness of the interview program,
see Sachs, supra, this program is also problematic.
97
Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Immigration Judges
and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Creppy Memo], availableat
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppyO92101 memo.pdf.
98
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media
Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 290-91 (D.N.J. 2002), stay granted, 122 S.Ct. 2655
(2002);judgment rev'd 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
99See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683-84.
'001d. at 684.
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government justification that was merely "facially legitimate and bona fide."''1 1
The national security reasons invoked by the government to justify blanket
secrecy clearly met this deferential standard, although these reasons were too
speculative to satisfy more searching review." 2
Equivalence theorists realized to their credit that arguing for open hearings
in all cases was not a tenable position. They adopted an integrative stance,
asserting that immigration judges could close individual proceedings upon a
showing of need by the government. Circuit courts are split on the need to
consider this less restrictive means for vindicating the government's concerns.
Previously, the only certainty in the access arena was that criminal
proceedings were presumptively open."0 3 Lower courts had held that other
proceedings, including civil actions, came with a right of access. 4 However,
another line of cases from the Supreme Court had indicated that the specialized
responsibilities of administrative and executive agencies could justify limits on
access."0 5 The presence of a clear right of access only to criminal proceedings

'O'See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 758 (1972) (upholding exclusion of avowedly
Marxist professor against First Amendment challenge brought by U.S. citizens who had invited
professor to speak in United States).
12
° For example, the government argued that a terrorist group that had recruited an alien might
read that the government was charging the alien only with immigration offenses, such as overstaying
a visa. As a result, the government asserted, the group could surmise that the government was
unaware of the alien's terrorist ties. See DetroitFree Press,303 F.3d at 687. The government never
considered that such groups, known for their willingness to entertain conspiracy theories, might
suspect just the opposite: that the government was aware of the alien's terrorist ties and was merely
trying to mislead the terrorists about the extent of its knowledge. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Why They
Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 429, 429-30 (2002)
(discussing terrorist group structure, interaction, and discourse). In addition, the ability of detainees
to self-disclose, which the government did not constrain, further vitiated the government's
arguments. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 687.
The government also propounded a "mosaic" theory, asserting that a terrorist group might
assemble apparently innocuous "bits and pieces" of information, such as the identity of a detainee
or the charges against him, into a useful block of data. Courts have rejected the "mosaic" argument,
observing that it lacks specificity and concreteness, and have insisted that the government, when
seeking to bar access to adjudications, demonstrate that such a barrier serves significant, as opposed
to speculative, government interests. See id.; cf Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100-07 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that government could not categorically refuse
to disclose names of post-September 11 detainees under Freedom of Information Act provision, 5
U.S.C. § 552, that permits withholding information that "could reasonably be expected to interfere
with [law] enforcement proceedings"), order stayed by 217 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2002).
"°3See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
"°'SeePublicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding First
Amendment required presumptive openness of civil trials).
'See Houchin v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1,3 (1978) (rejecting argument that television station
had First Amendment right to film inside jail); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164,
1174-76 (3d Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument that media had First Amendment right to inspect
documents on water contamination). Neither of these cases, however, involved access to actual
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posed a special problem in the immigration context, since courts have just as
definitively held that deportation is not punishment but merely a regulatory action
designed to enforce visa conditions to which an alien agreed or to abate other
violations such as entry without proper inspection.106
Courts considering the legality of the government's blanket secrecy policy
have held that even a remedy such as deportation, while it may not carry the
stigma that society associates with punishment, nonetheless has consequences
that make public scrutiny essential." 7 These courts have invoked the test of
"logic" and "experience" that the Supreme Court announced when it held that
criminal trials are presumptively open to press and public.10 8 The courts' analysis
of these factors in the deportation context owes much to the values of institutional
accountability and fairness in time identified by the integrative approach. Noting
that federal regulations historically have allowed public access to deportation
proceedings, 0 9 courts have also pointed to the effects of a finding ofdeportability
on the unsettled lives of immigrants," 0 and the adverse effect of such a finding,
at least for LPRs, on "the ties that go with permanent residence."'' . Courts
rejecting the government's policy have asserted that imposing the "drastic
deprivation"" 2 of deportation in an adversarial setting logically requires the same
access that the public enjoys in thejudicial setting."13 Without access, courts have
warned, the government would be effectively unaccountable in deportation
matters.1 14
Courts have recognized that the severe consequences of deportation and the
arbitrariness bred by lack of public access are an unhealthy combination in a
democracy. As noted in the previous section, the vast majority of special interest
cases do not seem to involve persons with terrorist ties." 5 Rather, most of these
cases involve garden-variety overstays from countries in the Middle East and
South Asia. Viewed in this light, the special interest cases signify very little

administrative adjudicative proceedings. See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 293
(distinguishing cases).
6
"07
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
1 See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696.
'O8See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
"0 9See N.Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (2002)).
"OSee DetroitFree Press,303 F.3d at 693.
..Id. at 689. While the Creppy Memo has been implemented largely in cases involving aliens
who have overstayed their visas, nothing in the memo excludes hearings involving LPRs from the
reach of the government's secrecy policy. See Creppy Memo, supra note 97.
2
1 DetroitFree Press, 303 F.3d at 696 (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966)).
1131d.
"41d.at 683 (asserting that "[d]emocracies die behind closed doors").
I"See Sachs, supra note 81; cf Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 98 n.4
(discussing lack of terrorist ties of deported detainees, including group of 130 Pakistani nationals
who had committed immigration or miscellaneous criminal offenses).
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besides the government's interest in appearingto be doing something. Targeting
other groups composed largely of U.S. citizens would be more difficult, because
these groups can seek their remedy at the polls. The electoral helplessness of
aliens".6 makes the press virtually the only avenue for holding the government
accountable. For example, if granted access, the press could have asked why an
individual such as Anser Mahmood was held in isolation for four months even
though the government uncovered no evidence of terrorist ties. ' If aliens from
specific countries are being detained and deported for show, surely the public has
a right to know.
A presumptive right of public access would not materially impair legitimate
national security concerns. Where deportation proceedings involve evidence of
dangerousness implicating intelligence sources and methods, the government
retains the ability to seek to close proceedings on a case-by-case basis. Courts
rejecting the government's blanket secrecy policy have indicated a willingness
to entertain such individualized requests. "'8This balance allows the government
sufficient flexibility to vindicate national security goals, while fitting government
discretion within a framework that preserves fairness and accountability." 9
" 6 Cf WALZER, supra note 17, at 59 (discussing political powerlessness of some immigrant
communities); Bosniak, supra note 14, at 1126-37 (same); Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and
Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and JudicialReview, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1615,
1626 (2000) (same).
"'See Sachs, supra note 81.
"'See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 709-11.
" 9Courts also stress the careful tailoring of restrictions on information in cases, originating
in enforcement efforts by the Clinton Administration, in which the government sought to withhold
evidence not only from the public, but from the individual detainee; such limits on access trigger
due process concerns, since they impair the ability of the detainee to rebut government charges. See
Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416-17 (D.N.J. 1999) (ordering release of detainee held
on basis of secret evidence when detainee demonstrated that evidence had been provided by
detainee's ex-wife, who had made repeated allegations of domestic violence against him but had
failed to substantiate any of these accusations); see also Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 545
(3d Cir. 2001) (denying immigrant's motion for attorney's fees, holding that government's provision
of specific public summary of secret evidence to alien allowed him to rebut charges and rendered
government's position "substantially justified"); Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1303-04 (11 th
Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of asylum); Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2000)
(granting writ of habeas corpus and rejecting use of secret evidence in case in which government
summary was vague and conclusory), order vacatedand appealdismissed by 273 F.3d 1330 (11 th
Cir. 2001); cf In re Haddam, File No. A22 751 813-Arlington (Bd. of Immigration App. Dec. 1,
2000) (interim decision), 2000 BIA LEXIS 20 (considering secret evidence, but granting claimant's
request for asylum); Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kajka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of
Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51, 62 (1999) (discussing secret evidence issues);
Martin, supra note 31, at 68-76 (arguing that due process bars use of secret information in removal
proceedings against LPRs).
Secret evidence has a long history in immigration proceedings. See United States ex rel.
Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that secret
evidence "is abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed,
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V. THE USAPA, SECURITY, AND DEMOCRACY
As the immigration system sorts out issues regarding the apprehension of
suspected terrorists and access to information about pending proceedings, it will
look to the USAPA for guidance on the definition of terrorist activity. 2 The
USAPA is a wide-ranging statute devoted to making terrorist organizations
accountable. To that end, the USAPA provides for the removal of immigrants
who engage in fundraising, solicitation of new members, and the provision of
material support for organizations designated as terrorist organizations by the
U.S. Secretary of State. 2 1 It also creates a duty of care for immigrants assisting
organizations not so designated, requiring that immigrants take reasonable steps
22
to ascertain whether their assistance would further specific terrorist activities.
The substance of the USAPA's removal provisions centers on terrorist
infrastructure, not ideas.'
Overall, this approach enhances transnational

the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and uncorrected");
Weisselberg, supra note 39, at 1020-33 (discussing McCarthy era use of secret evidence).
' 2°The INA, including amendments enacted as part of the USAPA, defines terrorist activity,
in part, as committing or threatening or conspiring to commit hijacking, kidnapping, violent attacks
on persons, assassination, or the use of biological or explosive agents to endanger the safety of one
or more persons or to damage property. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2002).
The USAPA's main addition here is the inclusion of damage to property as a form of terrorist
activity. See id, 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V). Civil liberties groups have expressed concern that
this provision could lead to the classification as terrorists of groups such as People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA), Greenpeace, and various anti-globalization groups that target
property to disrupt practices with which these groups disagree. See Press Release, American Civil
Liberties Union, Upsetting Checks and Balances: Congressional Hostility to Courts in Times of
Crisis, Statement of Laura W. Murphy (Nov. 1, 2001), at
www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=9811&c=1 1 l&Type=s. These are
legitimate concerns. However, because the government has given no indication that it will target
such groups,
I do not address this issue here.
'2 1See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)-(Vl) (Supp. 2002).
'221d., 8 U.S.C. § I182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd).
23
1 The provisions of the USAPA that govern admissibilityof immigrants to the United States
do target ideas. See, e.g., id, 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI) (declaring inadmissible any alien who
"has used [his or her] position of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist
activity.., in a way that the Secretary of State has determined undermines United States efforts to
reduce or eliminate terrorist activities"). While removal provisions concern immigrants who have
already entered the United States, either lawfully or unlawfully, admissibility provisions deal with
prospective immigrants who seek entry into the United States from abroad or have been
apprehended or detained seeking entrance at a port of entry such as an airport, harbor, or border
crossing. Since courts have held that immigrants who have entered the United States and are thus
subject to removal tend to have deeper ties to this country and therefore should enjoy a greater
spectrum of constitutional protections than those who have not entered, the discussion here focuses
on the removal provisions. Cf Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 713-14 (2001) (distinguishing
entrants from non-entrants). For a useful and comprehensive discussion of the inadmissibility
provisions, see Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: The UnintendedConsequences of the USA
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accountability. It also avoids the tension with democracy that restrictions on the
expression of ideas would entail. However, certain procedural aspects of the
statutory scheme threaten democratic values. The best way to grasp both the
substantive strengths and procedural infirmities of the USAPA is to consider
separately the two kinds of organizations addressed in the Act: (1) organizations
designated by the U.S. Secretary of State as terrorist organizations, and (2)
organizations not so designated at the time of the conduct that gave rise to
removal proceedings. The following subsections address these two categories in
turn.
A. DesignatedOrganizations
In 1996, Congress granted the U.S. Secretary of State authority to designate
transnational groups as terrorist organizations. 124 The USAPA creates an
additional mechanism for the U.S. Secretary of State to designate organizations,
in consultation with the U.S. Attorney General. The USAPA also streamlines the
required notice to Congress. Designation of an organization has significant25
consequences for immigrants actively participating in organizational activities. 1
For both designated and undesignated organizations, the USAPA identifies
a range of conduct as a basis for removability. 26 However, when conduct
concerns a designated organization, the government need not show a nexus
between the conduct and specific terrorist activity.'2 7 In addition, the government
organization
need not afford the immigrant an opportunity to demonstrate that the
28
designated does not condone or materially support terrorist acts. 1

PATRIOTAct for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 517-30 (2002).
24
' See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 302,
110 Stat. 1214, 1248-50 (1996) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2000)). In the past, "the
list" has included groups, such as Hamas, that engage in attacks on civilians but also claim to
engage in humanitarian activities. During the last quarter century, precursors to "the list" have
included groups such as the African National Congress, which during the reign of apartheid in
South Africa declined to rule out attacks on civilians.
25
Since September 11, the U.S. Secretary of State has put Al Qaeda on "the list," as well as
several organizations that the government believes have financially supported terrorist activity. See
James Risen, Saudi Prisoner Called a Chief of Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2001, at B3
(reporting on designation of Wafa Humanitarian Organization, Saudi-based charity, high-ranking
official of which allegedly diverted money raised in United States to Al Qaeda).
26
' These activities include fundraising, solicitation of new members, and the provision of safe
houses, transportation, false documents, weapons, and training. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)-(VI) (Supp. 2002).
1271d., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(bb).
128See INA § 219, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) (2000) (barring immigrants from contesting bases
for designation in removal proceedings); cf Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State,
251 F.3d 192, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that due process applies to designation decision).
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1. Designationand TransnationalAccountability
The absence of a nexus requirement for designated organizations embodies
the recognition that an organization cannot hermetically seal off acts of violence
against civilians from other aspects of its operations. "Legitimate" business
enterprises or religious charities contribute substantial revenue to terrorist
activity.'29 Organizations such as Hamas use humanitarian aid as a tactical tool,
assuring suicide bombers that their families will receive special assistance. 3 ° In
addition, humanitarian activities serve marketing goals. Humanitarian efforts win
over persons who might be discomfited by an exclusive focus on violence and
lend organizations that conduct terrorist activities a veneer of respectability and

29

See Abbas Amanat, Empowered Through Violence: The Reinventingoflslamic Extremism,

in THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 23, 44 (Strobe Talbott
& Nayan Chanda eds., 2001) (describing bin Laden "and his associates [as] men of worldly
capabilities who could employ business administration models to generate revenue [and] invest
capital in the market"); Wechsler, supra note 64, at 133-34 (discussing role of contributions to
Islamic charities in supporting terrorism); William K. Rashbaum & Benjamin Weiser, A Tramp
Freighter'sMoney Trail to Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at BI (detailing links between
businesses set up by bin Laden associates and funding for terrorism, including September 11
attacks); Risen, supra note 125 (discussing Al Qaeda's diversion of charitable contributions from
United States); Mike Robinson, Ill CharityHid Bin Laden Ties, Assoc. PRESS ONLINE, May 1,
2002, 2002 WL 20247580 (announcing federal indictment on perjury charges of executives of
Illinois charity).
Congress has made findings in enacting legislation that echo these concerns. See USAPA Title
11-International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, § 302, 115 Stat. 296, 296-98 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5311) ("[M]oney launderers
subvert legitimate financial mechanisms and banking relationships by using them as protective
covering for the movement of criminal proceeds and the financing of crime and terrorism.").
The aid to terrorist groups provided by charities does not always reflect the intentions of such
organizations. In many instances, well-placed persons within the organization may divert funds to
terrorist groups without the knowledge or approval of the organization's officers or board. See
Wechsler, supra note 64, at 133 ("[M]any legitimate charities have been infiltrated by Al Qaeda
associates
who then steal money that they direct to terrorism.").
130Some critics of the effort to disrupt terrorists' funding sources validate this concern. See,
e.g., Tahir Mahmoud, Muslim Charities in US Feel the Force of Anti-Islamic Crackdown,
MUSLIMEDIA INT'L, Jan. 1-15, 2002, at http://www.muslimedia.com/archives/world02/uscharity.htm ("Apparently zionists consider it a crime to support the children of martyred
Palestinians."); cf Amanat, supra note 129, at 45 (critiquing as perversion of Islam vision of
"martyrdom in the 'battle for the sake of God' reflected in last writing of September 11 hijackers'
ringleader, Mohamed Atta). See generally ESPOSITO, supra note 65, at 282 ("The use of violence
against civilians revealed deep cleavages within Hamas. If some of its leaders claimed that they were
not able to control some members of the [military] brigade, its critics rejected this distinction
between its political and military branches as duplicitous.").
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religious authority. 3 ' As Congress found several years ago, organizations that
commit terrorist acts "are so tainted by their criminal'1conduct
that any contribu32
tion to such an organization facilitates that conduct.
Immigration law, by leveraging the sought-after good of lawful immigration
status in the United States, can play a significant role in fashioning alternatives
to these organizations. New organizations can accomplish humanitarian or market
goals without subsidizing terrorism. Strengthened antiterrorism accounting
procedures can assist in this task. Transparency in tracing the destination of
contributions will deter organizations from deceiving contributors by disguising
aid for violent activities as humanitarian assistance. 133 Just as for-profit
corporations in the post-Enron era have to demonstrate that their accountants are
reliable,'3 4 charities with sound antiterrorist accounting will earn the trust of

131Cf Amanat, supra note 129, at 42-43 (describing how schools preaching Wahhabi
interpretation oflslam favored by Saudi establishment became "fertile ground for garnering support
for bin Laden"). But see Mahmoud, supra note 130 ("Hamas runs several different wings; its
military wing is completely distinct from its charitable wing, which runs schools, clinics,
orphanages,
and so forth.").
132See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214,
1247 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(7) (2001)); cf HEYMANN, supra note 22, at 156 (arguing
in favor of"[f]orbidding financial support ofany organization that is actively involved in supporting
political violence"). The infrastructural approach taken by the USAPA in dealing with terrorist
organizations resembles the economic pressure placed on the apartheid regime in South Africa by
the transnational corporate divestment movement. See Audie Klotz, Norms ReconstitutingInterests:
Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa, 49 INT'L ORG. 451, 464 (1995)
("[A]dvocates of divestment.., argued for complete corporate withdrawal as well as government
[and international] enforcement of economic disengagement.").
33
' Some charities have not attained this level oftransparency. See John Mintz, Muslim Charity
Leader Indicted; Foundation ChargedWith Giving Money, Aid to AI Qaeda, Bin Laden, WASH.
POST, Oct. 10, 2002, at A14 (reporting on indictment ofEsaam Arnaout, director of Benevolence
International Foundation in Chicago, who allegedly solicited contributions for "humanitarian" aid
and siphoned offthese contributions to support suicide bombers); Eric Lichtblau, CharityLeader
Accepts a Deal in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at Al (reporting on Arnaout's guilty
plea, in which he did not admit to funding terror but acknowledged that he had concealed use of
funds for Chechnyan and Bosnian rebel fighters by telling donors that contributions would be
"solely for humanitarian work for the benefit of civilian populations"); cf Holy Land Foundation
for Relief& Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 71-72 (D.D.C. 2002) (ruling that record
supported government's contention that organization allegedly linked with Hamas sent special
assistance
to families of suicide bombers).
134See Floyd Norris, Can Investors Believe Cash Flow Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002,
at CI (discussing investors' search for sound accounting in wake of Enron fiasco); cf John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 693 (1999) (noting that consistent
transnational accounting standards can promote informed investing).
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prospective donors.' 35 Organizations that decline to implement such procedures
should not be able to exploit the pool of human and financial capital represented
by America's immigrants.
The transnational accountability perspective is consistent with First
Amendment principles. 36 Mindful of national security concerns, courts have
never mechanically applied First Amendment categories to the immigration
context. Instead, courts have sought to balance the transnational and democratic
conceptions of accountability.

135Charities with sound antiterrorist systems will more effectively solicit contributions. See
Wechsler, supra note 64, at 143 (predicting that "risk-averse donors [will] start to find alternative
ways to further their political causes"); Diana J. Schemo, Arab Students Rediscover Voices Silenced
on Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A7 (quoting student who said that her group of activists
for Palestinian rights "wanted to contribute to a charity that said it built playgrounds in Bethlehem
but that students feared the foundation might turn up on a list of terrorist fronts").
The trend toward accountability has also affected the way in which business organizations
function in international and domestic legal systems. Policies that promote institutional
accountability are also an important element in other legal contexts, such as sexual harassment law.
See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-08 (1998) (discussing importance of
corporate sexual harassment policy as defense to sexual harassment claims); cf. Peter H. Schuck,
Against (And For)Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 553, 596
(1997) (arguing for more extensive and expeditious disclosure of donations to political candidates
and other transactions). See generallySteven R. Ratner, CorporationsandHuman Rights:A Theory
ofLegal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443,475-86 (2001) (arguing that multinational corporations
should be held accountable for human rights violations resulting from enterprises over which they
have control).
' 36The War Power would allow Congress to bar material assistance by citizens as well as
immigrants to organizations such as Al Qaeda, against whom Congress has authorized military
action in response to the September 11 attacks. The government would have a panoply ofremedies,
both civil and criminal, in such an instance. As John Walker Lindh, the American captured in
Afghanistan with Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, has discovered, even American citizens allegedly
offering assistance to Al'Qaeda may be prosecuted criminally. It seems likely that an American
citizen who did not go to Afghanistan but instead sought to aid Al Qaeda at a distance, through
significant financial support, could be prosecuted as well. The citizen charged with providing such
assistance would probably be precluded from asserting as a defense that his contribution was
intended for Al Qaeda's philanthropic endeavors. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 38-39
(1945) (noting in dicta that offering financial services to enemy agents, if proven by two witnesses,
might well constitute treason). The government would also be able to proceed civilly in such a case,
seizing funds that the citizen had given to the enemy government or entity. See McGrath v. Mfrs.
Trust Co., 338 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949) (discussing provisions of Trading with the Enemy Act).
For a useful analysis of the ability of the United States to engage in military action in Afghanistan
to reduce the threat of future attacks by Al Qaeda, see Falk, supra note 22, at 12 (arguing that action
by United Nations was not practical substitute for self-defense undertaken by United States); see
also Harold Hongju Koh, PreservingAmerican Values: The Challenge at Home and Abroad, in
THE AGE OF TERROR, supra note 129, at 143, 154 ("Given bin Laden's responsibility for the
September 11 attacks, international law also permits us to treat him and those in his network as
unlawful combatants who can be subjected to a reciprocal and proportionate military response.").
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Reflecting this balance, case law has tracked the "infrastructure, not ideas"
paradigm of the integrative approach. Modem courts have been reluctant to
uphold the deportation of immigrants merely for the expression of ideas
embodied in organizational membership. Instead, courts have considered the
immigrant's "degree of participation" or "meaningful association" in a designated
organization.' 37 Courts have also recognized that Congress, through its power
over defense and naturalization, can shape the contours of immigrant status to
meet national security concerns and provide an appropriate proving ground for
prospective citizens. 138 Congress acts within that authority when it reserves both
immigrant and visitor status for persons who decline to build the global
infrastructure of terror.' 39 Indeed, far from silencing immigrants, the USAPA
removal provisions may create more speech, encouraging immigrants to question
and change transnational institutions that engage in violence. 4 °

1 37

Generally, courts have regarded persons who belonged to an organization for a short period
and whose links to the organization seemed casual as lacking the requisite degree of participation.
See, e.g., Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 118 (1957) (refusing to deport immigrant who had
been member of Communist Party for less than one year and had worked as salesman at Party
bookstore, apparently because he needed job). Courts have been more willing to find a meaningful
association in cases involving longer and more intense involvement, collaboration with leaders of
the organization, and maintenance of secrecy surrounding group activities. See Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522,524 (1954) (deporting immigrant who had regularly attended Party meetings and had been
active in Speaking Club, affiliated group). Courts also generally have declined to find the requisite
degree of participation by immigrants substantially engaged in lawful domestic activities, such as
peaceful activism for social justice, even when these activities flowed from Communist Party
membership. See Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479-81 (1963); Najjar v. Reno,
97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1360-62 (S.D. Fla. 2000), order vacated and appeal dismissedby 273 F.3d
1330 (1 1th Cir. 2001). One court has held that Congress, in setting criteria for the deportation of
immigrants, is subject to the same First Amendment restrictions that apply in criminal law or other
contexts. See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC) v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1084
(C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, vacated sub nom. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.
Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Bosniak, supra note 14, at 1131-37
(discussing district court decision). Under an integrative approach, the government requires more
flexibility
than the AADC decision permitted.
13 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889). For critiques of this
proposition as it applies to the intersection of immigration status and First Amendment doctrine, see
Bosniak, supranote 14, at 1130-37; Katherine L. Pringle, Note, Silencingthe Speech of Strangers:
Constitutional Values and the First Amendment Rights of Resident Aliens, 81 GEO. L.J. 2073,
2077-80
(1993).
39
1 Cf Neuman, supra note 21, at 330-32 (arguing that 1996 statutory designation provisions
are consistent with First Amendment principles, even when, as in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), they
subject U.S. citizens to criminal penalties for material support of designated organizations).
.4.See generally ALBERT O.HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
INFIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30-43 (1970) (discussing importance ofvoice to dislodging
complacency within organizations). See also ESPOSITO, supra note 65, at 244-45 (arguing that
democracy is important element of modern Islam while acknowledging that "[a] major issue facing
Islamic movements is their ability, if in power, to tolerate diversity and political dissent"). If the
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2. Designationand DemocraticNorms
Procedural aspects of the provisions on designated organizations nevertheless pose a significant problem for both democratic accountability and fairness
in time. Designation is a powerful weapon, allowing the government to block
bank accounts and bar the organization's receipt of material support.'4 ' Permitting
the government to designate an organization without providing due process, such
as notice and an opportunity to respond, is a recipe for arbitrariness and
irremediable harm.
The most significant basis for concern is the impact of designation on
charities and other financial entities that do not engage in violence against
civilians. For example, the U.S. Secretary of State has designated Al Barakaat,
an organization working to rebuild Somalia's devastated infrastructure. While the
government has not demonstrated a link between Al Barakaat and terrorist
activity, the consequences of designation have imperiled recovery in Somalia.'4 2
Affording the organization predeprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard
could have averted this harm by providing the U.S. Secretary of State with more
information with which to reach a decision. Tailoring security concerns to
democratic principles would require such safeguards.
B. UndesignatedOrganizations
The USAPA removal provisions dealing with undesignated organizations
constrain government further by requiring proof of a nexus between the
assistance rendered by the immigrant and a specific terrorist activity.' The
undesignated organization provisions also impose what amounts to a duty of care
USAPA is to assist in achieving these goals, it must exist alongside a more proactive American
foreign policy that stresses openness and equal rights among our allies. Koh, supranote 136, at 145,
162 (calling for continuation of "long-standing [United States] effort to promote respect for human
rights on the part of... coalition partners"). To ensure that the USAPA, in promoting transnational
accountability, does not chill democratic accountability, courts should also resist any governmental
attempts to use the statute to target immigrants who question United States domestic and foreign
policy.41

1 See Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 204 (D.C. Cir.
2001); see also United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1049-54 (S.D. Cal. 2002)

(holding that designation decision by U.S. Secretary of State may be attacked collaterally by
defendants in criminal proceeding and that designation provisions ofthe Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 are unconstitutional on their face because they fail to provide
organizations
with opportunity to submit evidence challenging designation).
42
1 See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., How Blocking Assets Eraseda Wisp ofProsperity,N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 13,
2002, at A10.
14
1INA

§ 212,8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd) (Supp. 2002). The nexus requirement also

applies in the case of organizations not designated at the time of the charged conduct, but designated
previously or subsequently. See id., 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(3)(A).
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on immigrants. If the government can show a nexus, the burden shifts to the
immigrant to prove that "he did not know, and should not reasonably have
known, that [his assistance] . .. would further the organization's terrorist
activity.""' Prospective application of this burden-shifting approach is appropriate. However, retroactive application fails the test of fairness in time.
1. Accountability and the Duty of Care
In creating a duty of care for immigrants based on reasonableness, Congress
clearly sought to promote the accountability of terrorist organizations. To this
end, the duty of care provision provides for the removal of those who may not
have specifically intended to further terrorist activity, but who acted with
awareness that this result would occur, or failed to take reasonable steps, such as
asking questions or seeking documentation, that could have led to such
awareness. As in other settings, such as tort, a reasonableness standard provides
a measure of safety for the public that a standard based on specific intent or
45
recklessness lacks.

In the terrorist context, a duty of care provides a particularly important
safeguard. Terrorist organizations perpetrating outrages such as the September
11 attacks thrive on compartmentalized decisionmaking and access to information.146 Deniability is their stock in trade. Participants who ask questions about
matters beyond their "need to know" threaten deniability. A standard of care
requiring reasonable questions thus disrupts the organizational core of the
47
terrorist enterprise. 1

'44Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd).
'4See generally CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED
DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 173-96 (2001) (discussing evolution of
products
liability law).
146See Brian M. Jenkins, The OrganizationMen: Anatomy of a TerroristAttack, in HOW DID
THIS HAPPEN?, supra note 64, at 1, 9 (discussing importance of compartmentalization in Al Qaeda
operations, including September 11 attacks); cf SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA, MACHIAVELLI IN HELL 9
(1989) (discussing Machiavelli's view that conspiracies fail when they disseminate information too
widely among participants).
'The legislative history of the USAPA seemingly contradicts both statutory language and
legislative purpose on this score. Read superficially, it suggests that to be removable under these
provisions, the alien must "intend" to further terrorist activities. See 147 CONG. REC. S 11046-47
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (Joint Memorandum of Sens. Edward M. Kennedy & Sam Brownback).
An intent standard holds harmless even those persons who, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have discovered the relationship of their act to terrorist activity. Such a standard
would allow those charged under this subsection to assert in their defense, as Claude Rains protested
in a memorable line from the film Casablanca,that they are "shocked! Shocked!" that malfeasance
could occur. This elaborately orchestrated deniability is an essential element of terrorist
infrastructure. Congress clearly intended to dismantle it. The consistency of a reasonableness
standard with both the statutory language and Congress's policy goal of greater institutional
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To see how the nexus and duty of care requirements would work, consider
an example involving alleged fundraising for terrorist activity. A nexus could
involve a showing that $15,000 in funds solicited by an immigrant ended up
laundered through bank accounts whose "beneficial ownership" resided with a
terrorist organization 4 ' and that such accounts were subsequently drawn down
to fund terrorist activities.1 49 Despite the government's showing of a nexus, an
immigrant might be able to prevail if he could demonstrate that he had made
reasonable inquiries of the person or persons receiving the funds about
compliance with the money laundering abatement provisions of the new
legislation. If, on the other hand, the immigrant had merely handed over a large
quantity of cash with no questions about its destination, he would have failed to
discharge his duty of care.
2. Shifting the Burden on Duty of Care to the Immigrant
Prospective application of the burden-shifting provisions of the USAPA is
also consistent with fairness in time. Consider the test typically used for assessing
burdens and standards of proof: the Mathews v. Eldridge150 test that weighs the
individual interest, the government's interest, and the risk of error.'' Here the
individual's interest is in avoiding a "false positive" finding that he has acted to
further terrorism-a finding that could give rise to detention and removal. The
government's interest is in furthering the institutional accountability of terrorist
organizations, by encouraging prospective donors of human and financial capital
to make reasonable inquiries about the destination of their donations. As is often
the case in a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, risk of error is the deciding factor.
For prospective application, the risk of error factor favors placing the burden
on the immigrant to demonstrate that he discharged his duty of care, once the
government has demonstrated a nexus. Evidence pertaining to the exercise of care

accountability for terrorist organizations counsels against overreliance on the legislative history on
this point. This view is buttressed by the rushed drafting of the legislative history of the USAPA,
placed in the CongressionalRecord instead of a formal committee report.
Indeed, read in context, the legislative history seems more an attempt to explain the nexus
requirement than to opine on the issue of a standard of care. The discussion cited above appears in
the paragraph that describes the absence of a nexus requirement for assistance to designated
organizations. See id. The overarching theme of the paragraph is the clarification that the statute
waives proof of nexus only for organizations designated by the U.S. Secretary of State at the time
of provision of the alleged assistance. Any impact on the separate issue of the appropriate standard
of care seems inadvertent.
14'See 147 CONG. REC. S 11036 (daily ed. Oct. 25,2001) (statement of Sen. Levin) (discussing
International
Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001).
'49See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc) (Supp. 2002).
50424 U.S. 319 (1976).
51
' 1d. at 335.
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is within the immigrant's control. Upon the enactment of the USAPA, a prudent
lawyer would tell a prospective large donor 52 to put inquiries to organizations in
53
writing. To meet his burden, the immigrant would produce these documents.'
Such shifting of the burden based on a party's'superior access to information is
hardly without precedent in immigration law. Indeed, adjudication of the most
common basis for removal-physical presence in the United States without
documents establishing a lawful basis for such presence-involves an analogous
burden-shifting process.' 54

152An integrative approach would require that, to be a basis for removal, any assistance
rendered would have to be "material" in a legal sense, i.e., not casual or de minimis. Consider the
case of membership dues. Ordinarily, such dues represent a nominal amount. Allowing the payment
of dues to qualify as "material support" under INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), would
convert membership itself into a basis for removal, undermining the "infrastructure, not ideas"
paradigm outlined in the previous subsection. See supra notes 123 and 137-40 and accompanying
text (setting out paradigm).
53
' The defendant's control over this evidence effectively counters the argument of opponents
of burden-shifting that the immigrant is being asked to "prove a negative." See 147 CoNG. REC.
S 11022 (daily ed. Oct. 25,2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold). One can just as easily conceptualize
the immigrant's burden here as proving a positive, i.e., that he made reasonable inquiries. Viewed
prospectively, the immigrant is on notice that he should make such inquiries and retain evidence to
that effect. The notice provided and the immigrant's control over the evidence make burden-shifting
fair on the issue of exercise of care. On other issues, such as the nexus between the assistance
rendered and specific terrorist activity, burden-shifting would not meet the fairness in time test.
Given all the events in the world that one individual cannot control, it would not be reasonable to
require an immigrant to prove that none of his acts had a connection to any terrorist activity. The
USAPA recognizes this unfairness, too. That is why the burden of proving nexus resides with the
government. In a case where the government is more likely to have control over the relevant
evidence, the government should bear the burden. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 279 (1966)
(interpreting INA to mandate that on certain issues government bears burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence in deportation proceedings).
" 4 Under section 291 ofthe INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 33, at 687, once
the government has established that the person in immigration proceedings is a foreign national, the
immigrant bears the burden of proving "the time, place, and manner" of his entry into the United
States. The same logic of control over evidence that drives the burden-shifting under the USAPA
dictates this result. The government would encounter difficulty in describing the time, place, and
manner of entry for the tens of millions of immigrants and visitors who enter the United States
annually. However, the immigrant has documentation readily within her control, including a visa
and a stamped passport, to demonstrate that she has entered the country lawfully. If an immigrant
cannot produce this evidence, and the government does not have it, it is not unreasonable to
presume that she has entered without inspection. Burden-shifting is also a feature that courts have
upheld in the civil forfeiture context. See Annette Gurney, Beginner's Guide to FederalForfeiture,
J. KAN. BAR ASS'N, Mar. 2001, at 18, 21 (discussing imposition of burden of proof on claimant to
show that he was "innocent owner" of property seized by federal government).
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3. Retroactive Application
The analysis of burden-shifting is different for retroactive application. Here,
the respective interests are the same, but the risk of error-the risk of a false
positive-rises exponentially. Prior to the effective date of the USAPA, the
immigrant had no notice of a legal requirement for making the inquiries or
obtaining the documentation that the accountability reading of the Act contemplates. An immigrant who cannot produce documentation because he did not have
notice that such documentation was expected bears a high risk that a factfinder
will erroneously determine that he aided terrorism.
An example from the post-September 11 investigation illustrates how
retroactive application violates fairness in time. Consider the case of Mohdar
Mohamed Abdoulah, an acquaintance of two of the hijackers.'55 Abdoulah
provided the hijackers with what could be considered material assistance,
including selecting flight schools for the hijackers to attend.'56 The government
could readily prove that such assistance furthered the attacks of September 11.
Yet there is no indication that Abdoulah had any prior knowledge of the
hijacker's plans.' 57
After September 11, Abdoulah's acquiescence in the hijackers' requests for
help seems puzzling, at best. Given what we know now, the law can reasonably
expect a person to make a connection between flight schools and potential
terrorism. A person approached by another for help in making arrangements to
attend a flight school could reasonably be required to ask basic questions such as,
"Are you employed by a carrier that will pay for the school?" or "Are you
interested just in flying, or also in landing and taking off?" Before September 11,
however, even agencies charged with protecting the nation, such as the FBI,
failed to ask the right questions.
Before September 11, in other words, a flight school was just a flight school.
It seems only fair to impose the burden on the government to prove that the

"'55See James Sterngold, Muslims in San Diego Waver on Bail Pledge, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9,
2001, at56 B6.
1 See id.

5

' See James Sterngold, Man Linked to Hijackers Is Granted Bail; San Diego Muslims Put
up Money, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7. Abdoulah is currently charged with criminal counts
of immigration fraud, stemming from his alleging on his petition for asylum that he was a Somali
national, when in fact Yemen is his country of origin. Id. Based on Abdoulah's admitted assistance
to the hijackers and the fact that the hijackers are not available to confirm his account, a judge has
set Abdoulah's bail at $500,000. Stemgold, supra note 155. Members of the Muslim community
who initially indicated a willingness to raise the money for the bond have not yet achieved success,
because of wariness about federal scrutiny and concern that Abdoulah is not well known in the
community. See id
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immigrant knew then or should reasonably have known that his assistance would
further terrorist activity. Retroactively imposing the burden of proof on the
immigrant for pre-September 11 conduct obliges individuals not merely to make
reasonable assessments, but to predict the future. Requiring clairvoyance is not
consistent with fairness in time.
For this reason, retroactive application of new criteria for removal violates
not merely procedural, but substantive due process.'5 8 Immigrants, of whatever
status, should be on notice to conform their conduct before the law can impose
consequences such as detention'59 and removal. Retroactive application of
removal provisions therefore fails the test of democracy.
VI. CONCLUSION

The September 11 attacks pose a challenge for reconciling security and
democracy in American immigration law. The consequences of discounting
security concerns are clear in the hijackers' gaming of the immigration system.
However, the elevation of security at the expense of democracy threatens both of
these crucial values.
This Article proposes an integrative approach to the interaction of
democracy and security in immigration law. The premise of the integrative
approach is that democracy and security are interdependent in the immigration
arena. Immigrants historically have pushed the United States to live up to its
democratic ideals. Targeting immigrants threatens to render those ideals
expendable. At the same time, a nation must effectively protect persons within
its borders if it is to make good on the promise of self-government that democracy
entails.
On an integrative view, immigration measures needed to enhance security
also challenge America to refine and reaffirm its commitment to democracy. Two
criteria are central: institutional accountability and fairness in time. Accountability is necessary to control the institutions of American democracy, guarding
against overreaching and inequality. Accountability requires that American
institutions justify actions that single out particular groups, even (or perhaps
especially) groups that are universally reviled, by showing a reasonable
relationship between those actions and public safety. Transnational accountability

58
' See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316-17 (2001) (interpreting statute to avoid hardship that
would have arisen from retroactive repeal of statutory relief from deportation upon which immigrant
relied in plea bargain).
59
' See USAPA § 412(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)) (providing for mandatory detention
of aliens upon certification by U.S. Attorney General that they have engaged in terrorist activity);
cf Drew & Miller, supra note 95 (discussing lengthy detention of overstays pending verification
of detainees' lack of involvement in terrorism).
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is also vital, dismantling infrastructures of violence around the world, particularly
those that support the targeting of civilians here and abroad.
Fairness in time supplements democratic accountability, and tempers
transnational accountability, by setting norms of notice and prospective
application for immigration law that echo the dominant strains of American
jurisprudence. By respecting reasonable expectations that courts have allowed
immigration law to undermine since Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese
Exclusion Case), 6 ' fairness in time permits immigrants to exercise the human
faculty of planning for a better future. Fairness in time also recognizes that
disregarding the reliance interests of any group, including immigrants from
particular countries of origin, fosters disillusion and despair that can damage
national security.
Institutional accountability and fairness in time provide the flexibility and
fit required for immigration responses to terrorism. Consider three issues: the
detention of immigrants based on nationality or religion, the closure to the public
and media of immigration proceedings, and the USAPA's provisions for the
removal of immigrants who assist or materially support terrorist activity.
Immigration authorities should tailor detention to danger and flight risk and not
take the easy way out of reliance on nationality or religion. Courts should require
that immigration officials who seek to close immigration hearings show a
particularized basis for such a request.
With regard to the USAPA's terrorist removal provisions, transnational
accountability supports treating designated terrorist organizations, including Al
Qaeda, as integrated organizations in which assistance for alleged humanitarian
activities helps to market and subsidize violence against civilians. However, to
avoid arbitrariness, the U.S. Secretary of State should offer organizations notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to designation. In enforcing the USAPA's
removal provisions regarding assistance to undesignated terrorist organizations,
once the government has shown a nexus between assistance and specific terrorist
activity, it is appropriate to shift the burden of proof to the immigrant to
demonstrate that he has made reasonable inquiries about the ultimate obj ect of his
assistance. However, fairness in time requires that both the burden-shifting
provision and the substantive removal provisions of the statute operate prospectively, not retroactively, to provide adequate notice to the immigrant of the
contours of his duty of care.
The focus of the integrative approach on institutional accountability and
fairness in time provides guidance in meeting post-September 11 challenges to
American immigration law. Decisionmakers caught up in the rush of events may
not always find time to reflect on the interaction of democracy and security.

16130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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Turmoil may tempt decisionmakers to trade off one value against the other. An
integrative approach reminds us that trade-offs cannot substitute for helping
democracy and security go forward in the only way possible: together.

